I know Hamad from his days as a staff member at the Brookings Institute in Doha, Qatar. Whenever he was on a panel, I made a point to go because I found his perspective fascinating. He is a Muslim American citizen of Egyptian family heritage with numerous reasons to be skeptical about the United States, particularly for its constant errors in handling Middle Eastern affairs. With all the reservations he might have, he sees the United States as the world's best bet as a significant and positive influence in world affairs.
Hamad's book was written before the 2nd Trump administration began to dismantle institutions of government and challenge norms of decision making and decorum. Knowing the fuller context of what Trump has done by summer of 2026, Hamad's somewhat generous review of Trump's conduct was jarring. But I understood that Hamad's book is not about Trump although Trump personifies the complexity of governing in today's world and particularly the growing tolerance for oligarch and autocracy.
Authoritarianism and its manifestations have been the subject of critique for generations. Machiavelli's 16th century assertion that in leadership it is better to be feared than loved was followed by Hobbes' belief that "individuals, acting in their own self-interest, would willingly surrender their natural rights" (p. 28). Relying on 20th century understanding of the relationship between power and social relations, Arendt "argued that power can be exercised with others only through cooperation and communication" (p. 29) which led to Nye's introduction of "soft power" where "coercion, bullying, and the use of force seemed both uncouth and gratuitous" (p. 29). "Autocrats understand, correctly, that freedom brings with it the opening of new possibilities" (p. 51) which is precisely the reason for their desperate attempts to control the narrative and actuality of their conduct. These are terrific lenses through which contemporary politics can be analyzed.
Hypocrisy is one of Hamad's most pointed criticisms of the United States. Particularly related to the Middle East, the U.S.A. has consistently served as a protector of Israel and therefore always chooses those who at least do not threaten it, regardless of the degree of their autocratic abuses of their own citizens. With Israel as well as most of America's foreign policy decisions, "For a nation, if not necessarily an individual, to be seen as hypocritical is the cost of trying to be moral" and, thus, "hypocrisy is a necessary component of a moral life" (p. 147). The interesting reflection about the United States under a Trump administration is that, although often claiming moral grounds, it is less hypocritical simply because the opaque grounds for its work are relatively easy to see through. Trump's behavior and foreign policy is simply transactional and intended to achieve his own or his oligarch partners' benefit. While attempting to serve multiple masters, Trump's greatest vulnerability may be trying to do too many things at once, many of which reflect "competing agendas that create inconsistency and incoherence" (p. 158).
Hamad's belief is that democracy as an ideal guarantees that there will be hypocrisy and plenty of it. The point is that the ideal was perhaps actualized for a brief period in Greece when it was a small and growing in its increasingly sophisticated view of its affairs and role in the world. Perhaps serving all people with fairness is impossible in the modern day. The problem with hypocrisy, which most people recognize comes in the political theater, is that the individual who is a hypocrite "is different because of his ostentatious morality, which is meant to obscure and deceive" (p. 128). The electoral competitions and controversies that we now observe as replete with this dynamic, with candidates claiming the ability to solve difficult problems in short order with simple solutions. As raw populism and authoritarianism surges in the U.S. and around the world, increasing "polarization provides proof that American democracy is alive and well" (p. 113).
The self-doubt of many American citizens (i.e., oikophobia = "fear or hatred of home or one's own society," p. 62), reflected in citizen pride dropping from 69% in 2004 to 38% in 2022, is not helpful. Instead, Hamad pleas for American exceptionalism and a belief that "democracy, for all its faults, is clearly preferable to the alternative" (p. 91). "To say that America is always the villain is like saying that America is always a force for good; neither is true, and the impulses that drive these seemingly opposed claims are more similar than we night like to admit" (p. 153). Hamad declares in his "Introduction" that "America can change and improve on itself precisely because it is an idea... ideas are about aspiring toward -- and not losing hope in the possibility of -- something better" (p. 5). I take to heart Hamad's philosophy that in order to counter doubt "in life as well as in politics..., it's better to err on the side of ambition" (p. 18).
